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to the views in question. These chapters follow what one might call a historical method.
Chapter 4 is, in my estimation, the only chapter that brings these two
methods together in a unified way. This non-uniformity of style might
well make the book difficult for some readers. Those interested in the
exposition of a Thomistic view of DDS might find one half of the book
overly focused on contemporary, analytic arguments. Others interested in
the analysis of the arguments might find the long sections explaining, but
often not analyzing, Aquinas’s arguments to be tiresome.
My own view, as someone interested in both these topics and methods,
is that each part of the book does its useful share in making the general
case that Dolezal intends to make in the text. Part of what one needs to do
when resuscitating a maligned doctrine is show that it is, in reality, that
very doctrine one is breathing life into. One has to show that it is resurrection and not frankensteinian devilry that one is attempting. But another
part of saving the doctrine is showing that the wounds it has received are
not hopeless. There is no use propping up the doctrine if the next argument will send it tumbling again. I think that Dolezal has succeeded in the
former part, and, with the large exception of the appeal to mystery in the
final chapter, has succeeded in the latter as well.

God’s Final Victory: A Comparative Philosophical Case for Universalism, by John
Kronen and Eric Reitan. Bloomsbury Academic, 2011. 240 pages. $65.00
(hardcover).
IOANNA-MARIA LOVE, University of Glasgow
In God’s Final Victory, Kronen and Reitan offer a comparative defense of a
doctrine of universal salvation by critically challenging any form of a doctrine of hell that holds that some human beings will be forever separated
from God. Their aim is to explain why a doctrine of universal salvation is
more philosophically defensible and better philosophically fits with the
most plausible understandings of core teachings of Christian tradition
than any versions of hell. The book presents a comprehensive and up-todate overview of the relevant philosophical and theological literature. No
person who engages in the problem of hell and universal salvation will be
able to dismiss the arguments made in this book.
What strikes me as exceptional is the presentation and attention to detail in unfolding the various versions of hellism and universalism in this
book. Following a clear chapter 1 “Introduction,” in chapters 2 through 4,
Kronen and Reitan set their comparative case in favor of universalism by
enumerating the various species of both doctrines of hell (DH) and doctrines of universal salvation (DU) respectively. They argue that defenders
of each species of DH or DU can find support for their views in Scriptures.
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However, taking scriptural texts in isolation is not the best way in addressing disagreements that emerge between the doctrines.
In chapter 2, Kronen and Reitan distinguish different versions of
hellism in two ways, first, by the nature of the suffering of the damned
and, second, by the causes of damnation. There are those versions of
hellism which appeal to retributive justice—known as juridical doctrines
of hell from which the most important are (1) the Classical doctrine of hell
or traditional doctrine of hell and (2) the retributive doctrine of hell and
(ii) those versions which appeal to God’s respect for human freedom—referred to as liberal doctrines of hell. All versions of DH commit one to the
view that God is “either defeated by sin or complicit in its perpetuation
thus raising serious questions about God’s sovereign, goodness, or both”
(25). Kronen and Reitan argue that these versions of DH fail.
In chapter 3, Kronen and Reitan offer two complete versions of DU.
According to the first, which they call DU1, God wills the salvation of
all human creatures by God’s “perfect benevolence,” by virtue of the “all
sufficient Atonement of Christ,” God’s “complacent love for His own majesty” and God’s “complacent love for rational creatures as created in His
image and essentially ordered to Him as its ultimate objective end” (30).
The means God might use to save the wicked is “by efficacious grace” (42).
According to the second version, which they refer to as DU2, God wills
the salvation of all God’s human creatures for the above reasons, but the
means God may use to save the wicked are by preserving them indefinitely and working on their salvation until a time comes that they will
accept the offer of salvation (44–47).
In what follows, Kronen and Reitan argue that either DU1 or DU2 is
superior to the most defensible version of DH.
In chapter 4, they reject the common assumption that the witness of
Scripture unanimously supports DH over DU. It is difficult to claim, they
argue, that DH can be verified by an appeal to Scriptural plain sense, because taking scriptural passages in plain sense does not offer a decisive
guide in choosing DH over DU. What is required is to pursue a careful
philosophical engagement with core Christian Principles in order to be
able to interpret Scripture in the best way possible.
In chapter 5, they offer a prima face case for favoring DU over DH given
a Christian understanding of love. They offer three arguments for DU in
terms of “God’s benevolence,” “God’s complacent love” and God’s “love
for the blessed” (68). These arguments are convincing, as long as we assume that “there is nothing in God’s character that would conflict with His
love so as to impel Him not to will the salvation or the means of saving
all” and “there is available to God a morally permissible means of saving
all” (127). Defenders of DH have to deny one or the other of these assumptions. Those who deny the first appeal to divine justice and hold that salvation of sinners would violate the demands of retributive justice. Those
who deny the second appeal to human freedom and hold that salvation is
guaranteed only if God wills or can override human freedom, but either
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God is not able to do this, or freedom is of such importance that it would
be morally impermissible for God to act on it.
The heart of the book, chapters 6 through 8, focuses on a detailed explanation and critical assessment of the two defenses of DH. Kronen and
Reitan go through the difficulties and objections facing both versions as
well as the ways to overcome these point by point while developing their
comparative case in favor of DU. I believe the most important contribution
to contemporary debate in this book is their critique of the argument from
freedom—that is, the argument that there can be no universal salvation
without God’s compromising creaturely autonomy, something which a
morally perfect God would not do—by employing the “Argument of Efficacious Grace” (131–137) and the “Argument from Infinite Opportunity”
(160–162).
In chapter 6, they argue that demands of justice actually provide God
with further reason beyond God’s love to will all human creatures’ salvation as an end. Endorsing an Anselmian theory of atonement, they argue
that because “Christ satisfied the demands of justice on the cross God is
free to act on His benevolence to pursue the salvation of all” (33). Crucifixion, in their view, “is seen both as God’s ultimate condemnation for all sin
at its root, and at the same time, as the greatest expression of divine love
for fallen humanity” (116). Embracing a vicarious Atonement would put
aside any account of justice and sin that would demand eternal damnation.
In chapter 7, Reitan and Kronen challenge the liberal doctrine of hell
and specifically the argument from freedom in terms of what they call
the “Argument from Efficacious Grace,” which is a species of grace “sufficiently by itself to fully convert creatures, such that all who receive it are
saved” (128). Both argue that if there is such a grace and God can legitimately extend it to all human beings, then there is a version of DU which
holds that God ensures the salvation of all by applying efficacious grace
and so liberal doctrines of hell fail.
They concentrate on the claim that God can guarantee salvation by
conferring efficacious grace without overriding any individual’s freedom
by endorsing a Thomistic view of freedom. In a nutshell, the Thomistic
view holds that the human will is ordered to follow reason and, in turn,
reason is ordered to follow what is objectively good. Consequently, an action is free as long as reason and a person’s will operate according to their
natures. This shows, they hold, that “one can produce uniform motives
in ways that impede rational freedom and in ways that do not” (135). Efficacious grace is a divine act that produces “uniformly salvation-favoring
motives” (135) in a way that it does not violate freedom. God has the
means to save the sinners: He “can and morally may present creatures
with a full understanding of what union with Him involves while removing any affective impediments to acting on this understanding” (179), and
this would guarantee the conversion of any creature. In this way, they
claim, the Thomistic view of freedom supports DU1.
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In chapter 8, they challenge further the argument from freedom, and in
particular the Molinist account of freedom, in terms of what they refer to
as the “Argument from Infinite Opportunity.” They argue that even if God
is morally prohibited from “extending efficacious grace out of respect for
libertarian freedom, He retains a morally permissible means of guaranteeing universal salvation” (129). God shows his love for the unregenerate by
indefinitely preserving them “in conditions suited to inspiring free repentance,” a state in which they remain free to choose communion with God.
In doing so, “God can bring it about that universal salvation amounts to a
kind of mathematical certainty” (44). This leads them to hold that DU2 is
more plausible than any liberal doctrine of hell.
Chapter 9 ends the book with a summary of the overall argument with
reflection on the Doctrine of Annihilation and the Doctrine of Soteriological Agnosticism as well as other Christian concerns about the connection
between this life and whatever life may come beyond this one.
Views and arguments in the book are clearly presented and explained,
and the prose succeeds in constructing an accessible and pleasurable narrative. However, I am not convinced that the arguments offered guarantee
universal salvation for a few reasons. Due to limitations of space, I briefly
note only two.
It is evident that Kronen and Reitan build their arguments and explain
freedom within a theological framework. If we stand back, however, from
this theological framework and consider the goals to which human actions are directed, goals which are different from the ultimate goal—the
Christian God—it would be incorrect to hold that actions which are not
directed towards the ultimate end are irrational and thus not free. If we
step away from this framework and take into account how philosophers
have explained rationality, we get different views that take different approaches to what it means to act rationally and freely. If we view freedom
in non-theological terms, then one may well have to accept that some
people may have knowledge of what is best for them and yet they refuse
to be in relation to God, while making a choice which is rational and free.
Secondly, as much as I would like to accept the view that God will
achieve God’s universal purpose by preserving the sinners in conditions
which will help them freely repent and choose communion with God,
there are some issues which have not been addressed in the book and
need to be dealt with, such as: will there be some kind of punishment for
the worst sinners, and if there is, how will punishment help sinners freely
to accept God? What would be different in the afterlife environments
which would lead even the worst sinners to repent and be reconciled to
God? What element do the next worlds have that would necessarily lead
sinners to come to God?
Although I remain unpersuaded by the arguments offered, Kronen and
Reitan’s work is an important contribution to the debate, and it must be
said that specialists and enthusiasts will find this an excellent, challenging
and most welcome work.

